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FULL PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court in Griffin v. Illinois' and Douglas v. Cali-
fornia2 held that equal justice requires the state to provide' a tran-
script and an attorney to indigent defendants for appeal. These
decisions, while holding there is no due process right to an appeal,3
have guaranteed indigents the opportunity to gain full appellate
review of their convictions by recognizing an equal protection right
to effectuate a right to an appeal established by a state. At least until
the decision of the Court in Edwards v. California,4 racial discrimina-
tion in jury selection was the only area of criminal law where there
were equal protection decisions.5 The extension of the equal protec-
tion concept beyond criminal and civil cases involving racial dis-
crimination to cases where the discrimination was based on economic
classification was perhaps spurred by Brown v. Board of Education.0
The disrepute into which substantive due process had fallen7 may
also have been a factor in the Court's recent reliance upon equal
protection in the criminal law area.
The equal protection theory which has emerged following Brown
v. Board of Education is not easily susceptible to precise definition.
It lacks continuity, having no direct line of precedent and apparently
no historical justification. The Court has said it will not be "confined
to historic notions of equality ... [because] [n]otions of what con-
stitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause
do change." 8 How notions of equality have changed and, more impor-
1 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The Court held that Illinois must provide petitioners with a
transcript or "find other means of affording adequate and effective appellate review
to indigent defendants." Id. at 20.
2 372 US. 353 (1963). The Court held that petitioners were entitled to appointed
counsel for their first appeal as of right.
3 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 365 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 US. 12, 18 (1956).
4 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring). See also Dowd v. United
States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951) and Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942), both
cases where prisoners were prevented from initiating appeals by prison regulations
or official's conduct.
5 See notes 11, 50-53, infra.
6 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Pro-
motion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. Rv. 91, 94-95 (1966).
7 See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL , L, RV.
341, 364 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Tussman].
8 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
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tandy, how they will continue to change cannot be determined until
a theory of equal protection is formulated. Two methods of analysis
are possible in the area of criminal equal protection: first, an exam-
ination of the historical circumstances of the passage and ratification
of the fourteenth amendment accompanied by a retrospective recon-
struction of the purpose or intent of the equal protection clause
considered in light of the contemporary system of criminal justice;
second, a case by case analysis of recent decisions, with an attempt to
construct a model theory capable of rationalizing the cases and pre-
dicting future results. A third alternative, hypothecating original pur-
pose and discerning its evolution through a more or less continuous
line of precedent into a contemporary formulation, is not available
in the area of criminal equal protection.
II. HLsromcAL DEFINITION
Despite the Court's reluctance to consider the history of the
amendment, the research of tenBroek, James, Fairman, Bickel, and
Harris9 has demonstrated that an historical analysis leads to some
conclusions about the purpose of the amendment which are useful
today. The amendment, viewing the privileges and immunities, due
process, and equal protection clauses as a unit,10 was at a minimum
intended to assure that the Southern states would not'deprive the
recently freed Negro of his civil rights. Although the full extent of
these rights is not clear, they included the rights enumerated in the
Civil Rights Act of 1866:11
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evi-
dence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is en-joyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
9 J. TENBRoEK, EQuAL UNDER IAw (1965) [hereinafter cited as TENBRoEx]; J. JAMES,
THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AM'DMr (1956). [hereinafter cited as JAmEs];
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?-The
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Fairman]; A.
Bic, n., PoIrcs AND THE WARREN COURT (1966) [hereinatfer cited as BICKEL]; R.
HARis, THE QUEST FOR EquALrIY (1960) [hereinafter cited as HARIS].
10 HARRIs at 35-36, 44.
11 See BicEr. at 256-58; Fairman at 45-48, 138-139; HARms at 35, 40; JAMES at 179;
Roche, Equality in America: The Expansion of a Concept, 43 N.C.L. Ray. 249, 259
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Roche]; TENBRoE at 202-203. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
was passed under the authority granted Congress by the 13th Amendment. But the 14th
Amendment was passed, in part, to insure the constitutionality of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.
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pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.12
The emphasis of the framers was on protection or benefit of tile
laws which any government must afford to its citizens and persons
subject to its laws. The state itself was instituted to guarantee these
natural rights.13 The thesis that government is instituted to guarantee
at least a fundamental minimum of protection through law to its
citizens can be traced to the Abolitionist background of the Radical
Republican framers.14 The Abolitionist movement justified its politi-
cal objectives by proclaiming that the fundamental or natural rights
of Lan were guaranteed by the Constitution and found their expres-
sion in the Declaration of Independence, the Magna Charta, natural
law, and Christianity.15
In the congressional debates over the amendment and during
the ensuing election campaign of 1866 the supporters of the four-
teenth amendment distinguished between civil rights, which were to
be included within the amendment's ambit, and political and social
rights, which were excluded from the amendment's protection." The
terms civil, political, and social rights were never clearly defined or
distinguished in debate. But the ambiguity of the distinction made
is not the relevant factor for purposes of formulating a generalized
theory of equal protection which is meaningful today. Specific inclu-
sions or exclusions in the various categories should not determine
decisions which are made in the context of existent conditions.'7 It
is important that not all rights or legal consequences fell within the
scope of the fourteenth amendment, but only those rights of such
fundamental importance that all governments have an affirmative
duty to secure them for all men within their jurisdictions.' 8
12 14 Stat. 27, § 1 (1866); 42 US.C. § 1982 (1964).
13 HARRis at 1, 43-44.
14 JAmEs at 183-84; TENBRoEK at 29, 49-54, 119.
15 HARRIS at xiii and 1 Passim; TENBRoEI( at 51-52, 218-15, 232; Fairman at 138,
10 JAmEs at 163, 200-01; TENBRoa_ at 238.
17 See BirxiL at 248-61.
18 See HAmus at 1, 22-23, 43-44; TuSSmAN at 341-42; JAMEs at 106; TENBROEK at i1,
117-19, 222-23, 237. tenBroek is the most vigorous exponent of the protection theory
of the fourteenth amendment. His research revealed that in the debates over the four-
teenth amendment the authority of Congress
to secure to all persons "equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and
property," the qualifying word "equal" was almost entirely forgotten and
"protection" [was] treated as if it stood alone.... The essential clement of
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The imprecise definition and absence of specific enumeration of
the civil rights sought to be guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment
(and the equal protection clause)19 can be explained by the political
situation which confronted the Radical Republican sponsors of the
amendment. Thaddeus Stevens and other Radical Republicans began
the 39th session of Congress desiring legislation to enfranchise the
Negro 0° There was a practical as well as a moral reason for Negro
enfranchisement-maintenance of a Radical Republican majority in
Congress through the votes of the recently freed slaves.2 1 But the
Republicans were fearful that such legislation would not gain
Congressional or popular approval;2 2 therefore the goal of enfran-
chisement was temporarily abandoned, and sections 2 and 3 of the
fourteenth amendment were adopted as a compromise interim solu-
tion.2 Section 2 reduced the representation of states which excluded
twenty-one year old males from voting, and section 3 excluded certain
former Confederate officials from participation in the political pro-
cess. The compromise was a result of a pragmatic decision to seek
the possible and educate the public in the meantime.2 4 The Radical
Republican leadership felt that the general language of section 1 was
all that the country would accept. Specific guarantees were a political
liability, and a possible limitation on future congressional action.25
A further explanation for the vague definition of civil rights
was the framing process of the amendment itself. The amendment
was framed in secret by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction,
called the Committee of Fifteen,2 and the votes required for its
passage were assured by party caucus, also held in secret.2 In the
limited debate immediately preceding House and Senate approval,
relatively little discussion centered on the equal protection clause or
the first section of the amendment. Because of the general agreement
that the first section would constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of
1866 and the immediate political volatility of sections 2 and 3, little
the "equal protection" which Congress was empowered to provide was thus
protection, and equality was subordinate.
Id. at 211. Cf. Fairman at 65, 138-39.
19 See BIcrn. at 236.
20 JAMEs at 20.
21 See JA Ms at 3-20; Roche at 258.
22 JAmrs at 4-20, 53-54.
23 JAM.s at 183.
24 Bhc-r at 260; JAmys at 53-54, 185; Roche at 258.
25 See B rcru. at 258-60; JAmms at 71, 201.
26 JA us at 55.
27 JAMs at 149-50.
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was said about the first section.28 Throughout the entire 39th session
the Radical Republican sponsors steadfastly maintained that the
rights guaranteed by the amendment were not new, but that the
amendment merely allowed Congress to enforce existent civil rights.2 0
The expected immediate application of the amendment is sub.
ject to contradictory interpretations to the extent that there was
disagreement as to specific civil rights guaranteed by the first section.80
Then, as today, white racism was a dominant factor in the American
society.81 Ironically, as the amendment which incorporated the con-
cept of equality into the constitution was being debated, the Senate
galleries were segregated.3 2 During the debates several western sena-
tors rose to make it clear that they did not consider Chinese or Indian
Americans to be persons within the scope of the amendment.88
Reflecting this situation were statements made in debate and during
the campaign that the amendment would have no effect or would
not apply in the North. 4
Even if the existing social structure was hostile to full Negro
participation in American society, and it is assumed that the antic-
ipated effect of the first section, including the equal protection clause,
was restricted to guaranteeing the rights contained in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866,3, the broad framework of the amendment was
intentionally inclusive-protecting all persons. " The concept that
government is instituted to guarantee at least certain fundamental
rights to all men equally became a part of the Constitution. 7 Today,
the specific rights protected by the amendment in 1868 are not im.
portant to the solution of contemporary problems, because the his-
torical context of 1968 is different.38
III. EARLY SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION
The passage of the amendment itself, with the congressional
enforcement powers of section 5, was a manifestation of distrust for
28 BiciKa. at 252; HARUS at 35.
29 Fairman at 25-26; JAM s at 84-85; TENBRoEK at 232.
30 BicxxL at 260; Fairman at 138; JAMEs at 191; HARRiS at 36-37.
31 See JAMES at 180; Roche at 254; RE-PORT OF Tm NAT'L ADViSORy COMM'N ON
CwVm DisoRDEas 91 (1968).
32 JAmEs at 67.
33 HARXs at 28, 39.
34 JAmMsS at 185, 191.
35 See notes 11 and 12 supra and accompanying text.
36 Bicxs. at 257. But cf. Fairman at 31-32.
37 See note 18 supra.
38 See BxcxEI.L at 256-47, 260-61; Fairman at 32.
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the Court which had rendered the Dred Scott decision.3 In the
Slaughter-House Casesa° the Court was presented with its first op-
portunity to construe the fourteenth amendment, and its response
was to adopt the most restrictive interpretation possible. Bingham,
the principal draftsman of section 1, had placed great emphasis upon
the privileges and immunities clause, which the Court eviscerated.41
Moreover, the Court circumscribed the scope of the equal protection
clause in a dictum: "We doubt very much whether any action of a
State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a
class, or an account of their race, will ever be held to come within
the purview of this provision."4 -' The Court did not view the four-
teenth amendment as working any fundamental change in the pre-
existing state-federal government relationship, nor as any pervasive
change in the duties which government owed the individual 43
Just seventeen years after the passage of the fourteenth amend-
ment the scope of the equal protection clause was further limited by
the introduction of the state action doctrine in the Civil Rights
Cases." The congressional power of enforcement under section five
was limited to those situations where affirmative action by state legis-
lature, judiciary, or executive had denied protection of the law to
the Negro.45 The Civil Rights Act of 1875 had provided for full and
39 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.. (19 How.) 393 (1856); see BIc, L at 260; JAMES at 184.
40 83 US. (16 Wall.) 36, 73-74 (1872).
41 Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935) is the only Supreme Court case which has
upheld a privileges and immunities claim. Colgate was overruled in Madden v. Ken-
tucky, 309 US. 83, 92-93 (1940). Fairman at 25-26, 139; Harris at 82 n.l.
42 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872).
43 [We] do not see in those amendments any purpose to destroy the main
features of the general system. Under the pressure of all the excited feeling
growing out of war, our statesmen have still believed that the existence of the
States with powers for domestic and local government, including the regulation
of civil rights-the rights of person and of property-was essential to the
perfect working of our complex form of government, though they have
thought proper to impose additional limitations on the States, and to confer
additional power on that of the Nation. Id. at 82.
44 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883). See HARs at 44.
45 109 U.S. at 10-11:
It is absurd to affirm that, because the rights of life, liberty and property
(which include all civil rights that men have), are by the amendment sought
to be protected against invasion on the part of the State without due process
of law, Congress may therefore provide due process of law for their vindica-
tion in every case. Id. at 13.
1968]
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equal enjoyment of accomodations, inns, and public conveyances.40
The Court held that the Act was unconstitutional because it
step[ped] into the domain of local jurisprudence, and [laid]
down rules for the conduct of individuals in society towards
each other, and impose[d] sanctions for the enforcement of
those rules, without referring in any manner to any supposed
action of the State or its authorities. 47
Justice Bradley's opinion is predicated upon a view which had
gained ascendency by 1883-the Civil Rights Act of 1875 discrim-
inated against the white man:48
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomi-
tants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of
his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and
ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights
as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes
by which other men's rights are protected.49
The early criminal law equal protection cases, Ex parte Vir-
ginia,50 Strauder v. West Virginia,51 Virginia v. Rives,52 and Neal v.
Delaware53 dealt with the exclusion of Negroes from jury service
because of color. Their rationale is markedly different than that pro-
pounded in the Slaughter-House Cases and the Civil Rights Cases.
In Strauder the court said that the post-Civil War amendments
had a:
common purpose; namely, securing to a race recently emanci-
pated, a race that through many generations had been held in
slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy ... Dis-
criminations against them had been habitual .... the colored
race, as a race, was abject and ignorant, and in that condition
was unfitted to command the respect of those who had superior
intelligence. Their training had left them mere children, and as
such they needed the protection which a wise government
extends to those who are unable to protect themselves.64
There is no recognition by the Court of an affirmative duty of govern-
46 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
47 109 U.S. 3, 14 (1883).
48 Roche at 259; HARs at 89.
49 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883)
5Q 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
51 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
52 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
53 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
54 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879). Cf. id. at 307-08.
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ment to afford to all persons certain fundamental rights. 5 Plessy v.
Ferguson,56 also premised upon a theory of racial inferiority,57 was
the culmination of the immediate post-Civil War Court's restrictive
interpretation of the equal protection clause in the area of personal
rights. 58
IV. REJECTION OF THE STATE AcTiON LimrrATON
Brown v. Board of Education 9 marks the beginning of the
Supreme Court's reformulation of the fourteenth amendment equal
protection theory.60 The theory which the Court is developing im-
plicitly eschews the limitations imposed by the state action doctrine'1
and has applied equal protection to discriminations based on dassify-
ing factors other than race.
As the court has extended the ambit of the equal protection
clause beyond racial discriminations to other areas of inequality, a
dilution of the state action doctrine has occurred. In the racial area
the Court has abandoned all but the rhetoric of state action. The
doctrine has always been an ambiguous concept. It has been sixty-two
years since the court has held the fourteenth amendment inapplicable
in a case of racial discrimination on the ground that there was no
affirmative state action involved.6 2 Although the Court upheld the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 by reference to the commerce clause, rather
than the equal protection clause,63 there are many recent cases where
the nature of the relationship between the state and the discrimina-
tion was at best tenuous, if the state action doctrine is viewed as a
55 See note 18 supra.
56 163 US. 537 (1896).
57 See id. at 551-52; Roche at 264-65.
58 From 1873 to 1937 there was an expansion of the equal protection dause to
protect business and property interests from state discriminatory action. In that period
76.9% of all equal protection cases before the Supreme Court dealt with legislation
affecting economic interests. Only 14.2% of the equal protection cases raised questions
of racial discrimination. Criminal cases dealt with procedural problems and were an
insignificant proportion of the total number of equal protection claims decided. HAmu
at 59.
59 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
60 See Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv,. 205, 208
(1964); Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 Hnv. L. REv. 91, 92-93 (1966).
11 See text at note 71 infra.
62"Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition
14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 89 (1967).
63 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-305 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
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restriction on the scope of equal protection. In Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority64 the equal protection clause was held to forbid
discrimination by a privately owned restaurant which was located
in a building owned and operated by a state agency for public
purposes.65 The Court in Reitman v. Mulkey6 held that article I,
section 26 of the California Constitution (providing that individual
homeowners could sell to whomever they wished, closing the pur-
chase on the basis of whatever criteria the owner felt relevant) denied
equal protection of the laws.67 This decision seems more consistent
with a theory postulating governmental obligation to take affirmative
steps to protect its citizens from discrimination, rather than a state
action theory.68 As originally conceived the state action limitation
prevented Congress from pre-empting the states' exercise of its police
powers. It accomplished this purpose by requiring discriminatory
exercise of state police power before the equal protection clause could
be invoked by Congress as a constitutional basis for legislation pur-
suant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. 9 In Reitman the
Court was presented with a state constitutional amendment which
was a limitation on the exercise of state police power, the practical
effect of which was to allow individuals to discriminate against
Negroes while engaging in property transactions. The state refused
to guarantee or positively command non-discriminatory property
transfers. Although distinctions made between action and inaction
may become attenuated, it seems clear that the Court's decision
rejects that part of the state action doctrine which is predicated upon
non-intervention by a federal branch of government into the domain
of state police power, where the issue is whether or not such power
should be exercised. Moreover, the decision means that a state, in the
area of property transfers, cannot by constitutional provision allow
individuals to make transactions as they please, at least where the
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964).
64 865 U.S. 715 (1961).
65 Id. at 725. See Comment, Sit-Ins and State Action-Mr. Justice Douglas, Con.
curring, 14 STAN. L. REV. 762, 765 (1962) for the view that the equal protection clause
should not have been controlling in Burton.
66 387 US. 369 (1967).
67 Id. at 378-79, 380-81.
68 Cf. Black, Foreword: "State Action" Equal Protection, and California's Proposi.
tion 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 97-98 (1967): "regardless of original meaning" there should
be a "constitutional obligation resting on the states to quest after practical racial
equality .... "
69 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 14 (1883).
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effect is to discriminate against irrationally defined groups of potential
purchasers. 70 The implication is that the State has an affirmative
duty to assure every person the opportunity to purchase property.
Such an affirmative duty is consistent with an historical interpretation
of the original understanding of the framers of the fourteenth amend-
ment,7' and it is inconsistent with the state action doctrine, because
it "federalizes" local law governing property transfers.72
V. AFFIRmATIVE STATE Du-rms IN THE CMIINAL PROCES
The ultimate abandonment by the Court of the rhetoric and
substance of the state action doctrine and the substitution of a theory
recognizing an affirmative duty of the state to guarantee the protec-
tion of the law to each individual should also be the basis of a modern
theory of criminal equal protection. The Court in Griffin v. Illinois73
was apparently satisfied with the rhetoric of state action because it
found discriminatory state action in the existence of a state appellate
process which was inaccessible to indigent defendants.74
Justice Harlan in dissent argued that the real discriminator is
the poverty of the indigent defendant and that the State had no con-
stitutionally-imposed obligation to correct inequalities in economic
circumstance. 75
When Griffin is analyzed within the framework of the traditional
state action-equal protection concept, Harlan's critique has merit in
that it focuses on the real issue presented. An equal protection claim
prior to Griffin was based upon one of two theories. A classification
was unconstitutional either because it was unreasonable or because it
was an invidious discrimination. 6 A classification was reasonably
related to its purpose if it included all persons similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of the legislation or state activity.'7
A classification was invidious if the classification was an expression
7o See generally Black, Foreword, "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition 14, 81 Hv. L. REV. 69 (1967).
71 See note 18 supra.
72 See text at note 47 supra.
73 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
74 Id. at 18-19.
75 Id. at 34-35 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76 See generally Tussman, supra note 7.
77 Id. at 346. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) illustrates the tradi-
tional application of the equal protection test which merely requires that there be no
rational basis, reasonably conceived, to justify the classification.
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"of hostility or antagonism to certain groups of individuals."7 8 The
Illinois statute was not unconstitutional on its face, or as applied, by
either of these standards.79 The statute merely required the criminal
appellant to provide the appellate court with a bill of exceptions or
report of the trial proceedings to gain full direct appellate review. 0
Nonetheless, the Court in Griffin found an unconstitutional discrim-
ination.
The Court began with the premise that a defendant's financial
resources should not be a factor in determining guilt or innocence
at trial.8' To this premise the Court added the assumption that there
was no rational difference between a denial of a fair trial and a denial
of adequate appellate review.82 The conclusion, drawn by syllogism,
was that "[d]estitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appel-
late review as defendants who have money enough . . . ." to obtain
such reviews. 3 Thus the decision does not rest upon a rational basis
test directed at the relationship between the classification employed
and the purpose of the law.8 4 The thrust of the rationality argument
is that no distinction may be made between the right to trial and the
right to appeal.
The rationality argument is often used by the Court in extend-
ing due process to areas previously thought not to be protected by
due process safeguards.85 But the comparison of trial with appeal as
they relate to indigency was without precedent. The Court's premise
that guilt or innocence at trial should not be contingent on the defen-
dant's financial resources was not itself part of the decisional law at
78 Tussman at 358. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 US. 1, 11 (1967).
79 Comment, Indigent Court Costs and Bail: Charge Them to Equal Protection, 27
MD. L. REv. 154, 156 (1967). But cf. 351 U.S. at 17 n. 11.
80 The State of Illinois conceded in argument that petitioners needed a transcript
in order to obtain adequate appellate review. 351 U.S. at 16.
81 Id. at 17-18.
82 Id. at 18.
83 Id. at 19.
84 See Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81
H v L. REv. 435, 441-42 (1967) suggesting that Illinois might have argued that the
filing fee was to deter frivolous appeals. However, this argument would certainly have
been rejected by the Court. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962). It
seems apparent that the purpose of the Illinois statute was to make available an
adequate record for appeal, but the effect of its administration was to place the finan.
cial burden of obtaining a transcript on the individual defendant, rather than on the
state, except for the statutory exceptions made for capital cases or cases raising impor.
tant state or federal constitutional questions.
85 Cf. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 333-34 (1957).
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the time of Griffin.86 The comparison was not simply an extension
of the equal protection clause to a new area, but a complete reformu-
lation of equal protection doctrine. The Court in Griffin recognized
a constitutionally imposed duty to provide the indigent defendent
with the protection of the law.87 This theory of government is a
radical departure from that underlying the state action-equal protec-
tion theory.
The equality concept adopted by the court in Griffin and ex-
tended in Douglas v. CaliforniaOB is a comparison between the ability
of selected classes of individuals to utilize the appellate process. The
Court selected the group defined by indigency and compared that
group's ability to utilize the appellate process with that of the class
defined by wealth. The Court assumed that the class denominated
"rich" defendants is able to maximize the benefits that a model ap-
pellate process can afford any criminal defendant.89 This analysis,
carried to its ultimate extension, would require that every defendant
have the same or substantially the same realizable potential to max-
imize the benefits to defendants obtainable from the model appellate
process.
86 See Willcox & Bloustein, The Griffin Case--Poverty and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 43 CoarN. L.Q. 1, 3-5 (1957).
87 See Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HI-xv. L. REv. 91, 93 (1966); Willcox & Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 Copmu.r L.Q. 1, 16 (1957); Goldberg, Equality and
Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 205 (1964). Former Justice Goldberg said that
the Court in Griffin was "laying to rest the notion that equal protection requires only
equal laws and that the state is never obliged to equalize economic disparities...
Goldberg, supra at 218.
88 372 US. 353 (1963).
89 In Griffin the Court assumed that the petitioners could have alleged reversible
errors. 351 U.S. at 16. The benefit denied petitioners was the ability to present their
allegations of reversible error to the appellate court, because they were unable to draft
a bill of exceptions without a copy of their transcripts. In Douglas the Court again
argued by analogy, this time from the right to a free transcript on appeal to the right
to assistance of counsel on appeal. The Court said: "In either case the evil is the
same: discrimination against the indigent. For there can be no equal justice where
the kind of an appeal a man enjoys 'depends on the amount of money he has: "
372 US. at 355 (citation omitted). Again the defendant's ability to present alleged
reversible error to an appellate court was the benefit denied the indigent. Id. at 356.
The state has an affirmative duty
to provide the indigent as adequate and effective an appellate review as that
given appellants with funds-the State must provide the indigent defendant
with means of presenting his contentions to the appellate court which are as
good as those available to a nonindigent defendant with similar contentions.
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 496 (1963).
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Use of the equal protection clause to cover situations within the
appellate process not previously judged by an equal protection
standard may depend primarily upon the definitions of the class
considered. Arguably, the entire class of defendants denominated
not-wealthy and defined by the characteristic inability to maximize
the benefits of the appellate process are denied the equal protection
of the laws.10 An extension of the equal protection doctrine to the
trial process might then require the states to make available to all
but wealthy defendants investigative aids, the services of expert
witnesses, and clerical assistance in trial preparation or any other
items or services which would allow the defendant to maximize his
ability to use the trial process. The Court's theory invites expansion
into areas previously not judged by an equal protection standard
through semantic inclusion and exclusion.
The weakness in the Court's equal protection theory is that it
does not focus upon the protection of fundamental rights which the
state must provide each person within its jurisdiction. The effect of
Griffin and Douglas is to compel the states to provide transcripts and
attorneys for indigents on direct appeal, but that result is reached by
a semantic jingle which diverts attention from the right protected to
the criteria which define the class protected by the equal protection
clause in the particular case. The Court in Griffin explicitly adhered
to the holding in McKane v. Durston9' that there is no due process
right to appeal.92 But the Court went on to discuss the importance of
the review of the trial level determination of guilt or innocence
through the appellate process.08 The effect of the holding in Griffin
and Douglas is that the Court sub silentio holds that the right to
appellate review is of fundamental importance in our society today. 4
There may be some areas within the appellate process in which the
90 See Goldberg, Equality'and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 205, 221-22
(1964); Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 H av. L. REv. 91, 92 (1966).
91 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894).
92 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
93 All of the States now provide some method of appeal from criminal convic-
tions, recognizing the importance of appellate review to a correct adjudication
of guilt or innocence. Id. at 18.
94 See generally Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 81 IARV. L. REv. 435, 438 (1967); Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication
and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HID.v. L. REv. 91, 95-95 (196; Willcox &
Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CoaRN
L.Q. 1, 15-16 (1957).
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SYMPOSIUM: FULL PROTECTION
State has room to vary specific incidents or aspects of the appellate
process, but a State cannot refuse the fundamental right of appellate
process it provides for the protection of liberty. The standard by
which the operation of a particular State appellate process is to be
measured is full or equal application to every defendant.95 It is, there-
fore, the affirmative duty of the State to provide some kind of ap-
pellate process. That obligation generates the specific duty of a state
to provide transcript or counsel, because they are an integral and
indispensible part of any criminal appellate process a State might
devise.
The equality standard adopted by the Court in Griffin and
Douglas is too broad. If generalized it would require that any time
a state guarantees or affords a right, that right must be equal. But not
all laws are required to be equal. 96 Equality, proportionate or math-
ematical, becomes meaningful only in the context of the right sought
to be exercised. Therefore, the criminal equal protection cases can
be rationalized only if it is recognized that a two step test has been
employed by the Court. First, it must be determined whether the
right sought to be exercised by the defendant (e.g., the duty of the
state to provide an appellate process) is of such fundamental impor-
tance that it should be protected by the equal protection clause.
Second, if the right falls within the scope of the equal protection
clause, the Court must determine whether or not the individual
defendant is precluded from exercising the right because the benefits
to the defendant of the existing appellate structure are not made
equally or fully available to all defendants.
Mark R. Abel
95 Griffin v. flinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,
357-58 (1963).
96 See, e.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
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